



European Communities

**EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

# **SESSION DOCUMENTS**

English Edition

4462(103) ~~Ext~~ 1987-88

30 June 1987

SERIES A

DOCUMENT A 2-105/87

## REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee  
on political relations between the European Community  
and the United States of America

Rapporteur: Lord BETHELL

PE 111.206/fin.  
Or.En.

By letter of 8 November 1984 the Political Affairs Committee requested authorization to draw up a report on political relations between the European Community and the United States of America.

At its sitting of 14 January 1985 the European Parliament authorized the Political Affairs committee to draw up a report on this subject.

At its meeting of 1 March 1985 the Political Affairs Committee appointed Lord Bethell rapporteur.

The following motions for resolution were referred to the Political Affairs Committee by Parliament, pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, at its sittings of:

- 9 October 1984, motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Ephremidis and others on the dangers for Europe implicit in the resolution passed by the Republican Congress in the USA and the behaviour of President Reagan (Doc. 2-551/84);
- 23 October 1984, motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Glinne on the implementation of the McCarran-Walter Act in the United States (Doc. 2-741/84).

The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 28 January 1987, 26 March 1987, 29 April 1987, 25 May 1987 and 24 June 1987.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole by 30 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr ERCINI, chairman; Sir Peter VANNECK (vice-chairman); Lord BETHELL, rapporteur; Mr AIGNER (deputizing for Mrs Lenz), Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BALFE (deputizing for Mr Lomas), Mr BLUMENFELD, Mr DE GUCHT, Mr DELOROZOY (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr FITZGERLAD (deputizing for Mr Coste-Floret), Mr FLANAGAN, Mr FORD, Mr GLINNE, Mr HABSBURG, Mr HÄNSCH, Mr KEPSCHE, Mr van der LEK, Mr NEWENS, Mr PELIKAN (deputizing for Mr Amadei), Mr PENDERS, Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr PIQUET, Mr PIRKL (deputizing for Mr Estgen), Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mr POETTERING, Mr PRAG (deputizing for Lord Douro), Mr ROBLES PIQUER (deputizing for Mr Perinat Elio), Mr SABY (deputizing for Mr Jospin), Mr SÄLZER (deputizing for Mr Iodice), Mr SEGRE (deputizing for Mr Galuzzi), Mr TAYLOR (deputizing for Mr Romualdi), Mr TOKSVIG, Mr TZOUNIS, Mr WALTER and Mr WELSH.

The report was tabled on 30 June 1987.

The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.

PE 111.206/fin.

## C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION .....	5
B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT .....	9
ANNEX I: Motion for a resolution by Mr EPHREMIDIS and others on the dangers for Europe implicit in the resolution passed by the Republican Congress in the USA and the behaviour of President Reagan (doc. 2-551/84)	
ANNEX II: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE on the implementation of the McCarran-Walter Act in the United States (doc. 2-741/84)	

The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on political relations between the European Community and the United States of America

The European Parliament,

- Having regard to the following motions for resolution:
  - motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Ephremidis and others on the dangers for Europe implicit in the resolution passed by the Republican Congress in the USA and the behaviour of President Reagan (Doc. 2-551/84)
  - motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Glinne on the implementation of the McCarran-Walter Act in the United States (Doc. 2-741/84)
- Having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. A 2-105/87),
  - A. Bearing in mind the great political, economic, cultural, historical, legal and religious ties that have existed for many centuries between Europe and North America, ties which have remained and in many areas strengthened since the United States was founded;
  - B. Noting that the close links between the United States and the twelve European Community countries today are based on our joint commitment to pluralist democracy and to the civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights of the individual;
  - C. Recognising the great contribution made by the United States to the preservation and restoration of European freedom, especially in the struggle against racism and fascism during 1939-45, and in the economic reconstruction of devastated western Europe after the Second World War ; all of which strengthens the United States' and the European Community's joint determination to preserve peace and freedom in Europe;

- D. Recognising that in certain political and economic areas disagreements and conflicts of interest have led to problems in the EC-US relationship and that these disagreements are reflected in the views of substantial sections of the public, both in the European Community and in the United States;
- E. Recognising that many of the great scourges of our age, such as terrorism, drugs and AIDS, are of particular concern to the world's two main industrialised entities, the United States and the European Community;
- F. Expressing its concern at the apparent growth of protectionism in American political thinking, especially in the United States Congress ;
- G. Aware that the performance of the U.S. economy and the level of the U.S. currency have a profound effect on the economic growth of other countries including the European Community, as well as on the indebtedness of the Third World, and that any recession in the United States would hit developing countries especially hard;
- H. Noting that the sharp fall in the US currency, mainly due to the huge foreign trade deficit, means that there is a need to consolidate the EMS and to consider, with the American authorities, a broader role for the ECU in international transactions;
1. Confirms its belief in the need for a close political relationship between the European Community and the United States.
2. Regrets the fact that certain political problems, in particular over European security, international terrorism and on United States policy in Central America, as well as certain important economic conflicts of interest have arisen over the past few years.
3. Expresses its deep concern at the great stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons presently held by the two military blocs as well as the very high level of conventional forces now deployed in Europe; welcomes the proposals made for a reduction of the nuclear weapons and hopes that western Europe and the United States will work together closely so as to remove these dangers to European security, consulting and deciding on the basis of equal partnership.
4. Notes the United States' and the European Community's joint interest in the economic and social development of Central and South America as the best way of promoting democracy over dictatorship in this important region ; confirms the Community's commitment both to the Contadora initiative and to the San José process ; invites the Community to commit more financial resources towards achieving this joint aim

5. Regrets the confusion that has arisen in the western world as a result of revelations that the United States negotiated secretly with Iran and gave Iran arms in exchange for the release of hostages ; hopes that the United States and the Twelve will consult urgently, using all available channels including the Trevi Group and US experts in the field, to find a common position on international terrorism and the seizing of hostages by paramilitary groups, concerting their efforts so as to achieve the release of all such hostages irrespective of their nationality.
6. Invites the United States to consider the effect on the outside world, especially the Third World, of its volatile interest and currency rates ; expresses a willingness to cooperate with the United States so as to eliminate this problem.
7. Regrets that the European Community's political cooperation machinery does not yet allow the European side to speak with one voice in matters of security ; hopes that an improvement in such cooperation will result in more effective consultation between the US and Europe in security matters and an equitable sharing of the burden of western Europe's defense.
8. Draws attention to the serious problem, shared by both the European Community and the United States, of surplus food production, believing that the framework of the new GATT round offers some hope of bringing supply and demand of agricultural surpluses into a better balance.
9. Calls on the United States Congress not to prejudice the outcome of the GATT round by adopting protectionist legislation.
10. Emphasises the importance of resolving trade disputes between the United States and the EC in a spirit of goodwill, thereby making sure that the ties that bind the western alliance remain unbroken.
11. Notes the close cooperation with the Twelve in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; invites the United States government to bear this factor in mind, especially during the present Vienna review, and to seek common western positions on CSCE by consultation with the European Community.
12. Urges the European Community and the United States to consult most closely on questions of human rights, especially within CSCE, of which both the European Community and the United States are signatories.

13. Notes that while a growing number of countries, including all the European Community Member States, either have abolished, or no longer apply the death penalty, most states in the United States remain committed to capital punishment; expresses its deep concern that during the past year the number of prisoners on 'death row' has been the highest on record, that in 26 states persons under 18 can be sentenced to death and that evidence accepted by the Supreme Court in the McCleskey versus Kemp case shows that the race of the victim or of the defendant could be a factor when death sentences are passed.
14. Welcomes the enactment by the United States Congress of a law providing for a pilot programme of non-immigrant visa reciprocity; expresses the hope that, in due course, all law-abiding European Community citizens will be able to visit the United States without visas.
15. Expresses its satisfaction at the development of the twice-yearly meetings between Members of the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives; hopes that, from time to time, joint meetings of European Parliament and House specialist committees can take place to deal with specific problems, especially in agriculture and monetary affairs as well as (on a political basis) in such urgent matters as terrorism, drugs and AIDS; looks forward to the day when the European Parliament will have meetings, on a similar basis, with members of the United States Senate.
16. Instructs the President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Twelve meeting in Political Cooperation and to the Congress and Administration of the United States of America.

B.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

In 1984 Mr Klaus Hansch noted in his report to the European Parliament that "the relationship between the Community and the United States has run into difficulties ...". His explanatory note mentioned in particular the effect of high American interest rates and the value of the dollar on the European and Third World economies. He was critical of the "conservatism" of the Reagan administration with its proud proclamations about American values and its "idée fixe" about the Soviet "evil empire". He also pointed out a growing imbalance of effort in the Atlantic alliance and a difference of view as to the value of detente.

He quoted an opinion poll conducted by the Herald Tribune (November 29th, 1983) which showed a marked reduction overall in the percentage of west Europeans who see cooperation with the United States as the basis of their security. The reduction in the German Federal Republic, from 53 to 34 percent, was especially significant. There were also important falls in France and Italy, from 25 to 19 percent and from 27 to 22 percent respectively.

The past two years have brought further complications. Americans are inclined to blame western Europe for their economic difficulties, firstly in steel and then, when a US/EC agreement on steel was concluded in 1986, in agriculture. (US exports to Spain were hit badly when Spain joined the Community in January 1986).

In 1985 the US overseas trade deficit was \$148 billion. Their deficit with the Community was \$23 billion.

A New York Times opinion poll has produced the alarming conclusion that more than half the American people see overseas trade as "a bad thing". The United States has withdrawn from UNESCO and cut its contribution to the United Nations budget from 25 to 20 percent, thus arousing talk of the "sunset" of its internationalism.

Most dramatic of all was the American reaction to alleged European weakness, or even disloyalty, in the face of international terrorism. They were shocked by European criticism of the Achille Lauro passenger liner and they were disgusted by some European countries' refusal to provide overflight facilities for their air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi.

A large number of west Europeans (though probably not a majority) have been equally shocked by some aspects of American policy. True, American interest and dollar rates have fallen, so removing a source of instability in European finance. However, complications in the political arena continue



to cause problems.

There is widespread European scepticism about President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, resentment that it was announced in 1983 without consultation with allies and fear that it may destabilise relations with the Soviet Union, providing an at least partial defence for the United States but leaving western Europe unprotected.

Nicaragua is another problem. Europeans of the Left see a hypocrisy in American denunciation of terrorism when it is joined with American financial support for "counter-revolutionary" forces in a neighbouring country. These two issues, SDI and Nicaragua, were the trigger for the demonstrations by some members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg against the US President on May 8th, 1985.

A further American hypocrisy emerges from the revelation that members of the Administration have bargained with the Iranian government in an effort to secure the release of hostages held in Beirut, so violating the principle they have urged so strongly and publicly upon European governments in the past that the western allies should under no circumstances negotiate with terrorists. The United States is perceived to have fallen from grace over this issue and not lived up to its public pronouncements, so encouraging European governments to violate the principle also. The German government's reaction to the taking of German hostages in Beirut, in order to prevent the extradition of a terrorist suspect, is an example of this.

#### The State of the Alliance

The North Atlantic alliance was born out of the United States's pact with Great Britain against Nazi Germany in 1941-45 and then, after a short interval of semi-isolationism, out of a decision by President Truman that it was not in his country's interest to allow communist doctrine or Soviet armed force to spread further across Europe. The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed in March 1947, was first put to the test in Greece. Communist forces were defeated with American and British help. The Marshall Plan was launched a year later and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created in 1949.

Historians may view it as something of a freak that this alliance has survived for nearly 40 years, uninterrupted by the plurality of political views that exists in its ever-growing number of member states, including openly pro-Soviet communist parties and sometimes anti-American socialist parties. True, there was the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure, but this can be seen now not as a rupture but as a variant, which conveniently offered Spain a precedent for its chosen type of NATO accession.

The alliance remains fundamentally sound, but political problems of the past few years make it for the first time conceivable that serious fissures may develop in some of the main pillars that support it.

Americans continue to complain that they bear too much of the burden of Europe's defence. In 1985 the United States spent \$266.6 billion on defence,

6.5 percent of its GDP. Half this expenditure is estimated to be NATO-related. By contrast NATO's European members spent \$83.5 billion altogether, about 3.8 percent of their total GDP.

It is argued by the American side that western Europe, which has a similar population and larger GDP than the Soviet Union and her allies, should by now be in a better position to defend itself on its own, without relying so heavily on a distant ally. And the fact that Europeans are increasingly critical of American policy, that some are even anxious to close down American nuclear bases, serves only to strengthen this American point of view.

At the June 1986 meeting between US Congressmen and European Parliament members in Santa Fé, New Mexico, Representative Bereuter asked the inevitable question, "Is 40 years long enough?". The Truman Doctrine and NATO were conceived when Britain was poverty stricken and much of Continental Europe devastated by war. The American guarantee was the only way to protect a puny and helpless western Europe from the massive Soviet army. Today we have the European Community, rich and on its way to a European union. Is it not time to renegotiate the transatlantic relationship?

It was made clear in our Santa Fé talks that any American proposal to "bring the boys home" would be warmly welcomed by many on the European Left, including the British Labour Party. Whole or partial military withdrawal, they believe, would reduce American influence in Europe, economic as well as political, so making socialist goals easier to achieve and peace easier to preserve. Americans reply that, if ever western Europe were to request any such withdrawal, the United States would instantly oblige.

For the moment, though, and so long as Conservative governments stay in power in Germany and the United Kingdom, there is little sign that either side will make any such suggestion. In spite of Americans' belief that the cost of NATO is unfairly spread, proposals for withdrawal such as those of Senator Mike Mansfield in the 1960s are not being laid before the US Congress.

#### Nuclear Disarmament in Europe

Many Europeans believe that the US government is too rigid and negative in its talks with the Soviet Union on arms control, especially on nuclear weapons in Europe. This feeling, fuelled by President Reagan's reference to a possible limited nuclear war in Europe and his joking instruction on American television to "bomb Russia now", has given rise to political tension.

Until recently the debate was at its sharpest over the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles. The campaign against the neutron bomb had been successful - to the United States's irritation. The campaign against

Cruise and Pershing failed, however, and there is little agitation for their removal. It was noted with interest that the Soviet Union, having broken off arms limitation talks in apparent disgust after deployment, rejoined the talks as soon as this once again suited their convenience.

As a result of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's letter to President Reagan dated January 15, 1986, on balanced arms reduction in Europe, the President's special adviser Paul Nitze toured west European capitals to discuss the reply. (This move was welcomed as an example of better American consultation with European allies.) One of the variants put forward by Mr Nitze involved the removal of Cruise missiles from Britain and the Netherlands. American negotiators were surprised at the vehemence with which both European governments rejected any such idea. The notion of reversing a decision so agonisingly implemented was intolerable.

The suspicion nevertheless remains in Europe that there is one important current in the formation of the United States's foreign policy, prominent among whom is the so-called "prince of darkness", Deputy Secretary for Defense Richard Perle, which is opposed on principle to almost any agreement with Moscow on arms control. The Soviet Union would violate any such agreement, these hard-liners allegedly believe, just as they violate Salt II, a treaty which has outlived its usefulness. Furthermore, agreement would stifle American enterprise (which Russia cannot match) in the development of new weapons, especially defensive weapons, so wounding the American side in a conflict which cannot ever be fully resolved so long as the Soviet Union retains its present character, a conflict which the United States can and must eventually win.

It follows from this hypothesis that Mr Gorbachev's reasonable offers are being blocked by Mr Reagan's intransigence. And the same fate is likely to befall the Soviet offer put forward in June 1986, under which in return for substantial reductions in Soviet missiles the American side would, without abandoning SDI completely, commit itself to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and to non-deployment of any strategic defence system for a number of years.

The situation, it is suggested, is therefore very dangerous. There will be an arms race, particularly of missiles in the European theatre. Europe will become, even more than previously, the area where the two superpowers flex their military muscles. And it will be President Reagan's fault.

The Americans and other west European supporters (still a majority) protest that Mr Gorbachev's frequent and loudly proclaimed offers are merely old wine in new bottles, designed to sow division among the western allies rather than to provide the basis for true negotiation. They point out that, whereas the United States has 572 nuclear warheads deployed in western Europe, the Soviet Union has 270 SS20s and 120 SS4s in Europe, a total of 1170 warheads, as well as 171 SS20s (513 warheads) in Asia that could easily be moved to Europe, and that all these are in sites much easier to

defend through the Soviet bloc's draconian system of internal security.

President Reagan's friends point out that towards the end of the 1970s their weapons systems were obsolescent, no match for the Soviet systems (for instance the SS20s in the European theatre) that were already in place. Ammunition bunkers were empty, ships needed an overhaul and there had been a net loss in aircraft. The President, assuming power in January 1981, did no more than put right these deficiencies, making sure that American weapons did not go out of date before new ones were available. He did not, as had been alleged, go on a military spending spree. In fact the United States has today 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than it did in the 1970s. Furthermore, deployment of Cruise and Pershing was encouraged by many European governments and the decision to deploy was taken by President Carter.

The argument involves theories that cannot be proved. Which superpower is showing more goodwill, more readiness to compromise, more appreciation of the seriousness of the arms control issue and of the need to halt the build-up of weapons of mass destruction? Many Europeans, especially the Left, feel that Americans are approaching this, clearly the most important issue of all, since it involves mankind's survival, with insufficient tact and delicacy.

Geopolitically, the European Community's position is precarious. It is the ship between the two rocks, a small appendage attached to the bulk of Soviet-controlled Europe and the even more massive bulk of Soviet Asia. It is nervous of the fact that it is in the Soviet Union's thrall, unsure of its ability eventually to build up an independent security and meanwhile (from time to time) resentful of its reliance on the United States.

Soviet conventional forces, no more than a few hundred kilometres from its industrial centres, are overwhelming and the idea of defending Europe's territory by the use of nuclear weapons is scarcely thinkable, given the density of its population and the proximity of Soviet nuclear bases, ready to launch a counterstrike. On the other hand, its people are keen to preserve the system of government based on democratic pluralism that they share with the American people. If they are to succeed in this, they must find the right mixture of strength of purpose and wise caution. Americans and Europeans must know that it is a question not of choosing between the two, but of combining both.

Your rapporteur believes that confusions between the American and European positions on arms control result from differences of tactic rather than of principle. Arms negotiations involve bargaining and bluff. The western side must therefore, while showing its determination, be careful not to provoke the Russian bear so harshly as to risk a cataclysm. Differences of view over how to tackle this problem safely as well as effectively should not be exaggerated.

There are some in the Community who seek greater Soviet influence, a shift towards neutrality or even a change of allegiance, but they remain a minority. The Community institutions and the governments of member states

are still resolved to work with the United States to achieve an arms control agreement that will preserve European freedoms as well as security.

#### The Community and the Strategic Defence Initiative

The announcement of President Reagan's initiative on strategic defence was greeted in western Europe with varying degrees of scepticism and disapproval. The initiative had been launched without consultation with western allies. This apparent snub sharpened west European suggestions at the time that it was likely to destabilise relations with the Soviet Union and accelerate the arms race.

It was then said that SDI was unrealistic, as unreal as "star wars". Even if American technology found it possible to build a shield or protective "bubble" over the United States, it was said, the chances were that Soviet technology would find a way of penetrating it, such is the inbuilt advantage enjoyed by the aggressor.

Furthermore, SDI offered a defence only against high-trajectory missiles, which were to be shot out of the sky with satellite-based lasers. Where did this leave western Europe, which is threatened by intermediate-range missiles as well as the aircraft-carried bomb and the nuclear shell? There seemed little hope of the promised "mutually assured survival", especially as far as Europe was concerned.

President Reagan's astonishing proposal to share SDI technology with the Soviet Union, so providing both superpowers with strategic defence and, eventually, making the nuclear missile obsolete seemed equally unrealistic as well as a special threat to western Europe. For a moment the President seemed to be agreeing with Mr Gorbachev's idea of total nuclear disarmament. Was not this naive? Which superpower would destroy the last nuclear weapon?

And where would this leave western Europe, a territory which, we have been led to believe, can be defended only by the threat of nuclear retaliation to an assault on its eastern frontiers? SDI and mutually assured survival would mean the abandonment of the Community to the tender mercy of the Soviet Union's huge conventional forces, which performed so effectively in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Three years later many of these problems have been clarified. It is now conceded that SDI, even if successfully researched, built and deployed, would not free the world from the nuclear threat entirely. It would need to develop a further dimension before it was effective against low-trajectory missiles such as Cruise or against the bomber aircraft. It is unlikely to be effective against short-range missiles (SS21, SS22 and SS23) or nuclear artillery, or the man with the bomb in his suitcase.

SDI could defend the West against strategic or intermediate missiles, including SS20s, so defending western Europe to a certain extent. The launching of any such missile would, if SDI were operational, become

immediately detectible, because of the intense heat generated as soon as it is fired. The objective would then be to destroy the missile by laser technology a few seconds after the launch, before it had even left hostile territory. The "dome" would thus be built not over America or Europe, but over Soviet-controlled territory. The Soviet Union would be restricted to those low-speed warhead-carriers that could fly under the dome's lip.

Such restriction has its advantages. The high-trajectory ballistic missile reaches its target quickly and is therefore ideally suited to the pre-emptive strike. It is the aggressor's weapon, the one that the West must fear most and work hardest to neutralise. Furthermore, it is now clear that SDI is not as destabilising as many Europeans originally thought. It could never provide perfect defence, so giving the American side nuclear hegemony. An American leader recently remarked, "If you believe in mutually assured destruction, don't panic, it's not going to go away."

The US Administration believes that SDI is essential not only to strengthen American defence in the face of Soviet research in the same area, the military use of laser technology, but also to make an agreement on arms control more acceptable and likely to come to pass.

It was only the threat of US progress on SDI, they feel, that brought the Soviet side back to the negotiating table after the deployment of Cruise and Pershing. And only by playing the SDI "card" can an agreement be reached which the US Senate is likely to ratify. In fact, generally speaking, they say, any agreement negotiated by a more liberal administration would have a hard passage through the Senate. The Soviet Union would therefore be well advised to negotiate seriously under Mr Reagan's presidency, rather than waiting for a gentler American leader. And the west Europeans, if they want to see an agreement that does not suffer the fate of Salt II, should think in like terms.

SDI, in short, would bring for the first time an element of defensive capability into the American armoury. The United States would be in a position not only to retaliate with its own missiles, but also to block most of the enemy's. It could never be a perfect defence, but it could perhaps make unnecessary a massive programme of new offensive weapons, for instance a system of mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

It is also argued that Europe should encourage its own scientists to participate in the programme. In this way Europe could qualify for contracts, with the possibility of commercially valuable spin-offs, and gain a place at the table where SDI's future is discussed.

On the other hand, there may be political objection on the US's part, already expressed in an amendment put forward by Senator John Glenn, to the investment of large amounts of SDI money overseas and one can foresee arguments between European firms and the Pentagon over the ownership of any technical discovery. Nor should Europe forget its own investment in the Eureka project which, if it can be strengthened, will provide for

high-technology cooperation in defence among the Twelve rather than with a third country.

Your rapporteur believes that the EC should react cautiously to the SDI project. While it makes no sense for Europe simply to condemn it and stand aside while it proceeds, it would also be wrong for Europe to abandon its own efforts in the higher reaches of defence technology merely in the hope of contracts, which the senior partner in the alliance may or may not see fit to grant.

Above all, the Twelve should seek every opportunity to discuss with the US the full political implications of SDI, so as to ensure that west European security is not put in jeopardy.

#### TERRORISM: Europe's problem, America's fury

Throughout most of 1986 it would have been hard to exaggerate the American government's and people's anger at what they saw as western Europe's indifference, cowardice, or even disloyalty in the face of Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

The United States believes that the fact of Colonel Gaddhafi's involvement in international terrorism is undeniable. The Abu Nidal group, guilty of many atrocities including the attack on the Israeli ambassador in London and the recent highjacking of an Egyptian airliner to Malta, an episode in which many lives were lost, has its main base in Libya.

It was Libya that provided passports for the terrorists who carried out the massacres at Rome and Vienna airports. British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher was murdered by a gunman inside London's Libyan People's Bureau. Terrorists who bombed a discoteque in West Berlin in April 1986, causing two deaths, received instructions from Libya by radio.

Americans note that international terrorism is euro-centric. Its most frequent outbursts are on or around the Mediterranean. And it is here that terrorists claim the largest number of American lives as well as European. It is therefore here that the scourge must be tackled.

The United States believes that it is not enough to reduce the numbers of staff in Libyan People's Bureaux in the Community. "Break into a People's Bureau and you'll find it full of plastic explosive and detonators," one senior US official told me. They should therefore all be closed and Libyan Arab Airlines, whose involvement in terrorism has also been proved, should be banned from Community territory or airspace.

Americans were contemptuous of the original French decision (for which France was later to pay a terrible price) to release terrorist George Abdullah and of the Italian decision to release the main highjacker of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, from which a crippled American passenger

was murdered. US Congressmen note that the European Parliament voted to condemn the American action that resulted in the highjackers being captured. They find the vote incomprehensible.

Their incomprehension turns to disgust when they consider the French and Spanish refusal to allow F-111 bombers to overfly either country during the April 12th, 1986, raid on Tripoli and Benghazi. They have vivid memories of maps of the route their aircraft were forced to fly - a looping detour from British bases into the Atlantic, round Spain, through the Straits of Gibraltar and down the Mediterranean.

The long flight, they surmise, made the F-111 crews tired and less efficient. It may well have resulted in Gaddhafi being alerted as to what was happening and be part of the reason why one of the F-111s was shot down, with the loss of the crew, and why the raid's main objective, Gaddhafi's physical elimination, was not achieved. In short, they blame France and Spain for the mission's partial failure and for the loss of two American lives.

In June 1986 US Congressmen explained to the EP delegation that it was American "disgust" at Europe's approach to the terrorist problem, rather than any fear of attack, that was discouraging tourists from visiting European resorts. What they wanted from Europe was quite modest, they pointed out. Was it really so difficult for west European governments, supposedly allies, to fulfil these few American requests?

They want the Community to close the People's Bureaux, to ban Libyan airlines, to institute some control or surveillance of Middle East diplomatic baggage, to pool anti-terrorist intelligence, tighten up airport security and negotiate clear extradition treaties covering all acts of violence, irrespective of any political motive in the crime. They want the West to take the lead in outlawing terrorism by international agreement, just as chemical and bacteriological weapons are outlawed. The agreement would make it plain that an act of violence against the person was never justifiable through politics or ideology.

They believe that some Community governments (Greece and France, for instance) have made tacit agreements with terrorist groups, exchanging murderers in their jails for their countrymen held hostage in Beirut or offering diplomatic help in exchange for immunity from attack. This practice, they believe, has the effect of merely moving terrorist activity from one Community country to another. They want the practice stopped.

Above all they dislike what they see as European toleration of terrorism in exchange for commercial opportunity in Middle East countries, or (still worse) in order to pick up the business of those like the United States which take a tougher line.

As for the Libyan raid, they have no regrets. It did not, as many Europeans prophesied, provoke any massive retaliation. It did not cause the entire Middle East to rally to Gaddhafi's side. On the contrary, it caused



Gaddhafi to lose face, diminishing his influence both at home and abroad. It was therefore a "surgical cut" which, all in all, caused good rather than harm. They expect their European allies to understand this, to applaud and support them for their bold leadership in the fight against terrorism. And they are pleased by the idea that France, as a result of the recent Paris bomb outrages, is beginning to come round to their point of view.

The European Community would by a large majority agree with the United States about the need for much greater cooperation in the western world against the terrorists. There are however many in Europe who do not accept the simple American analysis of the problem, and of the measures needed to cure it, as outlined above,

Many feel that President Reagan has become obsessed with Libya, so that he exaggerates the evils of Colonel Gaddhafi to the exclusion of all the rest. Others believe that the United States, by supporting the Israeli cause so strongly and unwaveringly, has added fuel to Arab terrorism's flames.

Libyan-sponsored terrorism, it is suggested, is not the great menace to the United States that American leaders would have us believe. In 1983 there were 271 Americans killed in terrorist incidents, almost all of them the US marines bombed to death in one terrible Beirut explosion. In other recent years, though, the number of Americans killed by terrorists has been small: ten in 1980, five in 1981, seven in 1982, eleven in 1984 and 23 in 1985. And by no means all of these deaths can be laid at Gaddhafi's door.

Of course terrorists must be dealt with, but is it wise to rouse the entire American nation and call western Europe to arms against so puny an assassin, especially when more than 20,000 people every year are killed by murderers inside the United States and an even larger number on the roads? Where is America's sense of priorities? Many Europeans see at the base of the anti-Gaddhafi crusade not so much anger at the loss of innocent life as an expression of wounded national pride, irritation at the fact that a small-scale dictator can so publicly - and apparently with impunity - tweak the American eagle's tail feathers.

Other Europeans detect a hypocrisy in the American approach. Has the United States the moral right to condemn terrorism, at the same time supplying arms and equipment to the Nicaraguan "contras" and the Afghan mujahedin? So confusion starts and unanswerable questions begin to be asked. Are the African National Congress terrorists? Are the mujahedin terrorists? Or are they freedom fighters? The result is a mixing of moral principle and political taste which, in some Europeans' eyes, muddies the purity and clarity of the American case.

American officialdom answers this challenge by pointing out that the armed struggles in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua are "aimed at repressive totalitarian governments while operating on a strictly local basis". They seek to distinguish between international terrorism, which

the whole western world ought to unite to destroy, and local outrages which should be dealt with by local security forces only.

Among such "local" groups they would list the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Basque "ETA" group in Spain and the Irish Republican Army. Their position is that they oppose these groups, since they are aimed at governments of their allies, but they do not rally the world against them.

This distinction, conveniently for some US . Congressmen and Senators, relegates the "local" struggle against such groups as the IRA to the second line of American priority, this in spite of the cross-border dimension of the IRA's murderous attacks, which have taken place not only in Britain and Ireland, but also in the Netherlands, Belgium and other countries.

The US Administration's distinction between international and local terrorism is thus seen by many as a political convenience, rather than as a matter of principle, and the separation of terrorists from freedom fighters appears merely as a value judgement based on the expediency of the moment. Scepticism of this kind is strengthened by suggestions that, for reasons of American national interest, two more anti-Marxist resistance groups, UNITA in Angola and Prince Sihanouk's forces in Cambodia, will be receiving American finance and equipment.

Briefly, then, the European response to America's call for solidarity against Gaddhafi and other sponsors of terrorism is along the lines of the usual political divide. Centre and Right tendencies, which presently predominate in nine of the twelve EC governments and are naturally inclined to support our main ally, back strong American action against international terrorism. The Paris bombings and the Hindawi case have lessened such differences of opinion as emerged, for instance, over the Achille Lauro affair and the Libyan air raid. Those, such as your rapporteur, who are not convinced of the purity of the American case in ideological terms, nevertheless believe that western Europe, in order to protect its security and alliances, should form a more effective anti-terrorist policy in cooperation with the United States.

The Left, anxious to distance themselves from President Reagan's policies generally, condemned him over these two acts in particular. This point of view prevailed in several recent European Parliament votes and would manifest itself again if the United States were to launch another powerful armed initiative. (The EP as presently constituted, one must recall, comprises nothing like the nine-to-three centre-right majority that one detects in EC governments. In votes on international political issues the Left will usually win, at least until after the 1989 European election.)

The result is a serious EC/US political problem, since the American people cannot understand why a large part of the west European public feel this way about their sincere efforts to eradicate a terrifying Europe-based problem.

The problem was complicated further in late 1986 by the revelation

that senior US officials had tried to recruit the Iranian government as intermediaries in the release of hostages held in Beirut. Countries like Italy and Greece, which have been chastised by the United States for their "soft" approach to Arab terrorism, have been quick to point out this American inconsistency.

The "Irangate" revelations encouraged the German government to exchange the suspected hijacker Muhamed Ali Hamadi for Germans held hostage in Beirut by extremist groups. The fragile US/EC agreement on refusing any "deal" with terrorists was thereby put in jeopardy.

Your rapporteur believes that the US and the Twelve should urgently seek to rebuild their accord and establish a firm approach to the terrorist scourge. The Hindawi case and the Paris bombings have demonstrated the need for European unity on this question and disillusionment with American policy should not be allowed to prevent such cooperation.

#### United States policy towards Central and South America

This aspect of President Reagan's foreign policy arouses considerable hostility in EC countries. It is seen, very often, as little more than a selfish use of military and financial strength against weaker and poorer neighbours. The most controversial example of this is the United States's attitude towards Nicaragua.

Support for the Nicaraguan "democratic resistance", more widely known as the "contras", is seen in Europe as a bullying interference by a superpower against a small country, struggling to free itself from the legacy left by decades of American-supported right-wing dictatorship.

It seems to many Europeans an hypocrisy for the United States to complain about Soviet aggression in Afghanistan or Libyan and Syrian terrorism, while at the same time sponsoring an armed group that carries out acts of violence designed to destabilise a nearby government, one moreover with which the US preserves diplomatic relations.

The United States may well have violated international law by its mining of Nicaraguan ports, an act for which it was condemned by the international court in The Hague. An American citizen, Eugene Hasenfus, has been convicted of supplying arms to the "contras" and it seems likely that other Americans are so engaged, with the knowledge and approval of the US government. Such heavy-handed behaviour, many believe, has encouraged hard-liners in the Sandinista regime, hindering its development towards a gentler type of democratic socialism.

By financing the "contras", it is said, the United States undermines its own diplomatic influence in Nicaragua and neighbouring countries, irritating and embarrassing the friendly governments of Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica. It forces them into an agonising choice, either to quarrel with their provider - in the two years 1984-85

they received a total of \$1,800 million in US aid - or to betray a close fellow-Hispanic neighbour at the behest of the "yanqui" overlord. It forces Nicaragua into even closer ties with the only two countries ready to give help unequivocally, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The United States should therefore change its policy, abandon armed intervention and support the initiative put forward by Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela on the island of Contadora in January 1983. The Contadora initiative, backed as it is by the 12 EC members as well as by the five Central American countries and the South American "support group" consisting of Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, has the best chance of bringing democracy to Nicaragua and ending her isolation.

The view taken by many socialists in the Community is even stronger. They feel that the Sandinista movement is the way of the future in Latin America, an example to all countries in the region of how to escape from United States hegemony, and that its excesses, such as they are, are the result of the US government's imperialist policies and the CIA's crimes. The European Left supports similar movements in El Salvador and Guatemala, whose governments they see as gross violators of human rights.

Most EC governments agree that the Sandinistas ought to be influenced and restrained, but they are committed to doing this diplomatically, through the Contadora process. They reject, or do not take part in, the other aspect of the US "twin-track" policy, the sponsorship of guerilla fighters. In spite of some efforts, the Reagan administration has not been able to rally any significant group of European political figures, even of the centre-right, to support the counter-revolution.

In the western hemisphere the US is similarly isolated. Not even Chile supports the military dimension, at least not publicly. In fact, US officials say, several Latin American governments support the "contras", even though they dare not admit it. They secretly believe, it is said, that the Sandinistas with their 3,000 Cuban and 300 Soviet advisers really are a threat to the region, a "plague bacillus" that could infect the entire continent and must therefore be destroyed.

Americans detect a great naivety in the European position. They feel that Europeans visiting Nicaragua are too easily impressed by charades laid on for their benefit, for instance during the November 1984 elections, where a superficial show of fairness concealed a massive suppression of non-Marxist opportunity, especially in the media.

They point to the size of the Nicaraguan army, 75,000 men, more than the armies of Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica put together. Equipped with the most up-to-date Soviet weaponry, including helicopter gunships, it seems far bigger than necessary. It is led by nine "comandantes", all of them Marxists, and it is they who effectively rule the country. It is therefore, by any definition, a communist military dictatorship.

Non-Marxist political forces, including the Catholic Church, are suppressed.

An example is the recent exclusion from Nicaragua of two prominent Church leaders, Monsignor Caballo and Bishop Pablo Vega. Racial minorities, such as the Meskito Indians, have been persecuted.

In the past year the rule of the "comandantes" has become even harsher, it is said. A state of emergency was imposed in October 1985. Demonstrations and strikes were banned. The right to appeal and habeus corpus were suspended. Later the Church's radio station was closed, as was La Prensa, the only significant opposition newspaper.

Today non-Sandinista parties still exist, with seats in parliament, but the most valuable local forum, the outdoor rally, is denied them. They may only meet indoors and those who attend are harassed by police. More and more restrictions are placed on trade unions and on the private sector of the economy. The Parliament has lost power, with important laws being decreed by the nine "comandantes".

These measures have made many Europeans, including such socialist leaders as Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzales, disillusioned with the Sandinista experiment. To this extent European parliamentary opinion is following the American path. Five years ago there were many pro-Sandinista US congressmen. Today, in spite of the acute difference of view over support for the "contras", there is virtual unanimity in Congress on the disagreeable nature of the Nicaraguan regime.

In such circumstances, US officials point out, it is not surprising that support for the democratic resistance has grown, until it has an estimated 20,000 men under arms, about 20 percent of them former Sandinista supporters. (The proportion of former pro-Somoza national guard supporters is put at 27 percent.) The resistance is a people's legitimate struggle against dictatorship and, as such, it is supported financially by the United States. Congress has voted \$100 million, \$60 million of which was paid in October 1986, with \$40 million to be paid in February 1987. President Reagan is proposing \$105 million in "contra" funding for the 1988 budget.

The "contras" are thus an essential element in the American plan to overthrow the Sandinistas, or at least bring them to the bargaining table. The Contadora process is all very well, Americans say, but it will not do the job by itself. Diplomatic and economic pressure are, by themselves, not enough. Military pressure must be used also.

This is the difference of view between the Reagan administration and the EC governments. The Twelve will pursue the Contadora line at foreign minister level with 13 Latin American governments in Guatemala in February 1987. They will not support the "contras" and they doubt whether their pressure will make much impact on the undoubted Sandinista drift towards totalitarian Marxist rule. They suspect too that American support for the "contras" may well weaken in the last phase of Mr Reagan's presidency, in which he will control neither house of Congress and will

be carrying the burden of the "arms for Iran" scandal. He may well not have the votes needed to provide further financial help.

The EC hope that, if the Sandinistas cannot be overthrown, they can at least be contained within the small country of Nicaragua. The aim should therefore be to isolate or "albanianise" them by economic and political pressure from the rest of the region, so that in the end they become a bad investment from the Soviet point of view and are forced to seek better relations with non-Marxist countries.

Until this happens, though, the Sandinista regime will continue to pose serious problems for the US administration, not the least of which is the reaction of European public opinion to what appears, superficially at least, as a typical example of American heavy-handedness.

American government supporters cannot understand these attitudes. They feel that, whatever may have happened in the past, their recent record in Latin America is admirable. US influence has helped to reduce army power throughout the continent, persuading countries along the road to pluralism and reconciliation. In Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Uruguay the army is off its pedestal, parliamentary democracy (albeit of an imperfect type) has reappeared and for this the US government claims some credit.

In Central America, they believe, their influence has been even more important. For instance, the cut-off of military aid to Guatemala in the mid-1970s was an important reason why the army there finally agreed to hold elections. And, while human rights violations undoubtedly still occur, opponents no longer "disappear" in large numbers.

New parliamentary democracies are still being propped up with American money. In the past year the United States has given \$435 million to El Salvador, \$200 million to Costa Rica, \$182 million to Honduras and \$80 million to Guatemala.

A US official says, "There are 30 countries in the western hemisphere. A few years ago most of them were dictatorships. Now there are only five dictatorships, two of the right and three of the left: Chile, Paraguay, Cuba, Surinam and Nicaragua. And I predict that both Chile and Paraguay will be democracies in this century."

US officials are at pains to explain to west Europeans their good intentions in the region and their legitimate concerns. The situation in Mexico causes them particular alarm. One of the least democratic states in the continent, effectively ruled by a one-party system, Mexico suffers severe economic and social problems, which are made worse by the instability of Guatemala along Mexico's southern border and which already spill over the northern border into the United States. Drugs and illegal immigration are two of the problems. An estimated 10,000 people enter the United States illegally every day.

Americans resent the fact that, while they are required by treaty to defend western Europe, they are expected also to cure the instability and

poverty of the entire American continent - without any significant European support or sympathy. They know they cannot do this, but they think they are doing their best to help. They would like western Europe to understand and cooperate.

The EC is in a good position to do so. Christian Democrats and the Socialist International have good party ties with many Latin American countries. The accession of Latin America's two mother countries, Spain and Portugal, has provided a further bridge. Central and South America may not be western Europe's "back yard", but it is a region of enormous size, wealth and importance, with equally enormous problems. If it becomes the cause of political tension between the United States and the European Community, these problems will be exacerbated.

#### United States and European Perceptions of South Africa

US policy towards South Africa has, since the recent outbreak of violence, been broadly in line with that of the European Community. In America and western Europe there is agreement on the need to reject apartheid and work out a system where all South Africans share power. On both sides of the Atlantic the first step towards a solution is seen as the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and the beginning of talks between the Government and all political groupings, including the African National Congress, on a fair system of government.

In September 1985 both the US and the EC announced a series of measures against South Africa. The US administration issued an executive order banning any sale to South Africa of nuclear and computer products as well as the purchase of Krugerrands and bank loans to government agencies. The EC agreed on a number of "positive and negative measures", including a ban on new nuclear sales and grants of funds to train black South Africans for positions of responsibility.

The EC has its Code of Conduct, under which Community enterprises in South Africa undertake to provide equal opportunity to all their employees, irrespective of race. They report regularly on what steps they are taking as regards pay, promotion, fringe benefits and recreation. The aim is to remove apartheid, whether at the place of work or in eating and leisure activities, from EC-owned business in South Africa.

The US equivalent is the Sullivan Code. American firms must not only do away with racial discrimination, but also promote labour laws and responsible trade unionism. EC and US both believe that recent trade union reform in South Africa has taken place partly as a result of their pressure.

Differences arise mainly over economic sanctions, on whether the EC and US should cease trading with South Africa, withdrawing its investments and closing its gates to South Africa's products. Generally speaking,

the US Congress's approach to this matter is tough and militant. A recent Bill approved by both houses will impose a list of sanctions additional to those of September 1985, including a ban on flights into US by South African Airways. President Reagan was against these further measures, but he cannot now prevent their implementation.

The US Congress's tough stance is the result of electoral pressure and it manifests itself most strongly when Congressional elections are imminent, as they were back in the summer and autumn of 1986. Many Americans, especially black Americans, see the anti-apartheid struggle as a sequel to their own battle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, many believe that South Africa is no longer a marginal passing issue in American politics, but that it will be a matter of permanent concern to a black ethnic lobby, just as the Middle East is to Jewish Americans, East-West relations to Polish or Ukrainian Americans and Cyprus to Greek Americans.

Therefore, whereas the Administration is alive to the complications of South African politics, the danger of a take-over by extreme leftists in the ANC and the reliance of the West on South African raw materials, Congressmen and Senators are moved mainly by the simple need to do away with injustice, or at least to preserve their electoral support by being seen to play no part in perpetuating it.

Europeans tend to be more familiar with the South African problem. Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal have historical ties with the region. Many Portuguese moved to South Africa after Angola and Mozambique became independent. An estimated 1½ million white South Africans have the right to enter and live in a west European country.

Foreign investment in South Africa is likewise overwhelmingly European. Forty percent of it is British, 30 percent from the rest of the EC and only 20 percent American. Any collapse of the South African economy and political system would, therefore, have a serious effect on some EC countries. It would cause sudden large-scale immigration and additional unemployment. In other EC countries, for instance Denmark and Greece, the effect would be very small. In the United States it would be insignificant.

Still, in spite of these different perceptions, neither the EC nor the US has any long-term interest in prolonging the unjust apartheid system, quite apart from moral considerations. Their joint aim must therefore be to encourage a transfer of power, without bloodshed, to a government which, while remaining friendly to the West, represents all South Africa's people. However unlikely it may seem that this aim can ever be realised, the EC and US would be well advised to try their utmost to achieve it.



## United States and EC policy on human rights

The European Community and United States enjoy a common commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the United Nations Declaration and the two covenants that derive from it. They have a further responsibility as signatories to the CSCE Final Act, a document of particular concern to the Community since 33 of the 35 signatories are European. At the present Vienna review conference western Europe works closely with the US both jointly in the NATO context and bilaterally through EC-US talks.

Human rights in the US government is more codified and structured than in the EC governments. In 1976 the US Congress first required the State Department to report to it annually about the human rights record of countries receiving American aid. Aid was then refused to any country that was below standard. Guatemala and Argentina were examples of countries refused their "certificate" on human rights grounds. Shortly afterwards the State Department was obliged to report on every country's record and this they do in a thick book published at the end of January every year.

This has had an important bureaucratic effect on the State Department. Every US embassy now has its "human rights officer", whose duty it is to provide Washington with information for the annual report. These officers have become familiar with human rights problems. Their interest in the subject encourages them nowadays to send regular cables to Washington on the subject, so making it more important to the US government.

The State Department fulfils these duties by means of its Human Rights Unit, 50 foreign service officers who work full time in Washington digesting the input from missions abroad, dealing with enquiries from the public and Congress and preparing the report. They also process requests for political asylum. (There were 16,622 such requests in the year ending September 1985.)

Your rapporteur believes that this provides an excellent means for elected representatives to raise human rights issues at government level and that the framework is one that the EP would do well to suggest to the EC Presidency-in-Office.

Already the Presidency reports to the EP on human rights issues from time to time, either in plenary session or at the political committee's quarterly colloquies. In July 1986 a written text on human rights, drafted by the Dutch presidency, was approved by the Twelve foreign ministers. It would however be more effective if the Presidency could be persuaded to report to the EP regularly, on the basis of points raised by the EP in previous months.

True dialogue on the subject could then become possible and the large number of EP resolutions on human rights, which presently make little or no political impact, would become influential. The EP's views on human rights would then be a factor in the Community's relations with third countries, including members of the Lomé Convention. The system would be an approximation of the US model.

Differences of perception on human rights between EC and US will

continue, for instance over US influence in Central and South America. Another matter brought to your Rapporteur's attention is the United States's continued use of the death penalty.

In 1972 the US Supreme Court nullified all existing death sentences on the ground that, in most states, death penalty laws were being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Four years later, however, the Supreme Court allowed states to reinstate the death penalty, provided that new laws were passed that followed proper guidelines.

Since then 38 states have reintroduced such laws and a large number of prisoners have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1984 there were 1,464 prisoners under sentence of death and 21 were executed during the year. At least two men, Charles Rumbaugh in 1985 and Terry Roach in 1986, have been executed for crimes committed when they were 17 years old.

Bearing in mind the fact that the death penalty has not been applied in EC countries for many years and that the EP has expressed its opposition to it on principle, the EP may wish to include a paragraph in its Resolution calling for an end to the use of the death penalty in the United States.

One must however recall that such a measure could not be enacted by the US administration. The death penalty laws are passed by the individual states and only by an amendment to the US Constitution could the death penalty be abolished throughout the entire country.

Your Rapporteur hopes that, in spite of these differences of view, the EP will confirm the Community's desire to work closely with the United States in human rights matters.

#### Reciprocity over EC and US visitors' visas

Under present regulations US citizens may enter EC countries (except, for the moment, France) as visitors without obtaining a visa. EC citizens all need visas before entering the United States. West Europeans are sometimes irritated by this imbalance and the EP has for some years tried to rectify it by raising it repeatedly at the meetings with US Congressmen.

In November 1986 the US Congress, after several failed attempts, passed an Immigration Bill which included a pilot scheme to waive the visa requirement for certain non-US nationals. Eight countries will be chosen and in due course, probably in 1988, the Secretary of State will decide which they will be.

In order to qualify for the scheme, the country's citizens must have a less-than-two-percent refusal rate in their applications for US visas and a similarly low rate of violations of their terms of entry. The country must also accord visa-free access to US citizens and the visitor to the US using the scheme must possess a round-

trip air ticket refundable only in the country of origin.

The eight countries will be selected only when the Immigration Service, under the Department of Justice, has certified to the President that an effective means exists for policing the scheme.

About 25-30 countries will qualify for selection, among them Japan, which provides by far the largest number of visitors to the US. More than 800,000 visas were issued to Japanese in 1985. In order to qualify, though, Japan would have to reciprocate by offering visa-free entry to Americans. EC countries do this already.

West Europeans are the next most frequent US visitors. In 1985 more than a million visas were issued to EC citizens: about 372,000 to the United Kingdom, 246,000 to Germany, 175,000 to France and 103,000 to Italy. Also, many Europeans travel to the US on visas issued in previous years. In 1981 more than a million visas were issued to UK citizens alone, most of them valid indefinitely.

Several EC countries will, it is expected, be included in the visa-waiver pilot project. The State Department will, however, have to make invidious choices and countries not included may be offended. This is why your Rapporteur wishes that the scheme could be applied to all the 25-30 countries that qualify, especially since this number will probably include all 12 EC members.

A further problem is the US entry ban on anyone who is or has ever been a communist. All such persons, even EP members on official delegations, must obtain an individual "waiver" from the government before being allowed into the United States. There is also, though it is very seldom enforced, a similar ban on homosexuals. Your Rapporteur would like to see the repeal of such discriminatory laws.

Cheaper air travel has brought the transatlantic holiday within the range of many millions. Such contacts help EC-US mutual interest and understanding. Your Rapporteur would like to see the end of artificial barriers to such contacts: the removal of France's visa requirement on US and other non-EC citizens, the disappearance of American ideas on the supposed dangers of European travel and visa-free tourist travel to the US for all people whose fellow-countrymen do not significantly violate American law.

#### CONCLUSION

The impression gained by your Rapporteur both in Washington and in EC capitals confirms the view that EC-US political relations remain, in spite of the problems mentioned above, remarkably good. In recent months quarrels over trade, for instance in steel and certain foodstuffs, have been satisfactorily resolved. EC-US financial

problems also seem to have eased. (These matters are dealt with in reports prepared by other EP committees.) None of the outstanding political issues between EC and US is so serious as to amount to any immediate threat.

There are, however, signs of worse to come. Many Americans are resentful of western Europe's independent stances on certain issues. A difference of view may be seen as a sign of unfriendliness or disloyalty, whereas in fact it is little more than the adolescence of European unity. Americans react too, with more justification, when European writers or politicians put them on the same moral level as the Soviet Union. They deserve better than this, they feel, in view of our shared democratic values, our military alliance and for having helped us so generously in the recent past.

They recall a time when democratic socialists in western Europe were as firm as their centre-right adversaries in support for the Alliance and in opposition to Soviet influence. They read now that the British Labour Party intends closing US nuclear bases, that the German SPD envisages withdrawal from NATO's military structure, that Spain makes problems over continued American use of the Rota naval base and that Greece proposes to close all US bases completely. "Why do our allies behave in this way?" they ask themselves. "What has happened to western Europe's pro-American consensus? Why are we suddenly so controversial?"

They then begin to ask themselves whether it makes sense to maintain such a firm and expensive commitment to their "so-called European allies", whether it would make sense to shift some of this commitment to the Pacific basin, where US economic interests are quickly expanding, while links with Europe are becoming little more than historical, cultural and emotional.

True, they recognise western Europe's technological capability and they would not want this to fall into Soviet hands, but otherwise links with Europe are not a necessity, either economically or militarily. Europeanism comes from the American heart rather than from its head and the real world lies to the West. In other words, the US President is still "a Berliner", as President Kennedy was, but only just, and it would not take much to bring this protective arrangement to an end.

In the European Community, mainly but not exclusively on the political Left, doubts and resentments are just as strong. US policy, locally in Central America and globally in the superpower conflict, seems bellicose and dangerous, taking little account of Europe's vulnerability to Soviet anger and nuclear devastation on a scale that does not threaten the United States. Such critics see President Reagan as a posturing ideologue, obsessed with the communist menace and insensitive to pleas for caution.

European Leftist and "Green" parties owe much of their support

to such feelings. However, there is also in some EC countries a growing feeling that the Community should as soon as possible, in its own interest, go even further and cut the umbilical cord with the New World entirely.

This view, which may be termed the "mega-Gaullist heresy", is based on the idea that the EC will never achieve unity or prosperity, that it will always be the "poor relation" in terms of economic and political influence, so long as it remains under US protection. The EC should therefore assume a middle position between the superpowers, expand its trade with the Soviet bloc, exploit to the full its ties with the Third World, which for historical reasons are better than those either of the US or the USSR, take responsibility for its own security, with the help of French and British nuclear forces, and so build up its independent strength.

It is argued in support of this theory that an EC independent of the US, though anxious to maintain good relations and trade with both superpowers, would be a reassurance to the Soviet Union. The EC would then be able to negotiate the withdrawal of both superpowers' military forces from western and central Europe. The way would be paved for greater EC influence in the Mediterranean and greater democracy in central Europe. Eventually, there would be no obstacle to German reunification.

Such ideas, in their entirety, may seem unrealistic and, if ever implemented, dangerously destabilising. They do nevertheless lurk in the minds of many EC forward-thinkers and they should, in your Rapporteur's view, be discussed frankly, since they reflect many Europeans' frustration over what they see as their over-dependence on the United States.

A far more likely outcome, and one that appeals far more to your Rapporteur, is a slow development of EC unity, leading to a stronger EC economy and, eventually, an alliance of equals between EC and US. As movement towards European Union proceeds, there will be tensions in the EC-US relationship, but these will be overcome because of our common interests.

It is to be hoped that the United States, although it will often be irritated by west European rebelliousness, will look kindly on the EC as it goes through this difficult phase, while at the same time the EC learns to understand the concerns of the great power, its own child, which has looked after its parents generously for nearly half a century.

In this way the EC and US ought to be able to maintain their close family relationship.

-----

ANNEX\_I

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 2-551/84)  
tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr ADAMOU and Mr ALAVANOS  
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the dangers for Europe implicit in the resolution passed by the  
Republican Congress in the USA and the behaviour of President Reagan

The European Parliament,

- A. concerned at the attitudes towards the major problem of détente and armaments expressed in the political resolution of the Republican Party Congress in Dallas, Texas which depart from the broadly accepted principles of balance and equal security for all sides,
  - B. whereas the view expressed in the Republican programme, that Europe will be defended by making the USA more powerful than any potential enemy, implies, while signalling the adoption of an attitude of superiority, grave dangers for world peace and, in particular, peace in Europe where the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons confronting each other make it the most critical area in the world,
  - C. deeply concerned also at President Reagan's notorious radio announcement about the destruction of Russia in 5 minutes,
  - D. stressing that this resolution has no bearing on electoral procedures in the USA and noting that the Republican Party and President Reagan are meddling dangerously in issues affecting the very survival of the peoples of Europe,
- 
- 1. Strongly protests at the views of the Republican programme and the aimless and dangerous words of the president of one of the countries whose policy is of crucial importance for Europe's future in the world;
  - 2. Expresses its strong belief in reducing arms to the lowest possible level on the basis of the principle of equal security for all sides, disarmament and détente, which is the only policy that can guarantee peace in Europe;
  - 3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the governments of the Member States and the government of the USA.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 2-741/84)  
tabled by Mr GLINNE  
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the implementation of the McCarran-Walter Act in the  
United States

The European Parliament,

- A - whereas since 1952, many foreigners wishing to visit the United States have been refused a visa under the McCarran-Walter Act on the basis of their political views,
- B - whereas many writers, students and scientists have been affected by these measures, including Gabriel Garcia Marquez, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Dario Fo, Italian director and actor, and Hortensia Allende, widow of the assassinated Chilean President,
- C - whereas since the beginning of the year, a large number of public figures and members of Congress have been urging a campaign for the revision of this Act,
  - 1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to urge the United States Government to revise and liberalize American immigration laws;
  - 2. Urges that European legislation be revised if the American immigration authorities maintain their requirement that nationals of EEC Member States must obtain a visa: it is not right that nationals of the United States should be allowed to enter Europe without a visa whilst Europeans crossing the Atlantic are forced to obtain one;
  - 3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the EEC, the Council of Ministers and to the United States Congress.